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Introduction
This paper estimates a Phillips curve model for Irish consumer price inflation, using annual data for the period 1926 to 2012. This period includes the three monetary policy regimes that have been in force since the foundation of the state: the parity link with Sterling to 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) from 1979 to 1998, when monetary policy effectively operated under an adjustable peg regime, and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) from 1999 onwards. It also includes the transformation of the economy from one that was predominantly agricultural to one that is modern and highly advanced.
With few exceptions, a large literature on the Irish inflation process has failed to find a role for domestic demand. 1 Indeed, the notion of domestic demand playing a role seems to have been dismissed early on, and is not even tested in many papers.
Instead, the literature views Ireland during the period of the link to Sterling as a small part of the UK economy and sees inflation pressures as largely determined with little or no role for excess demand in Ireland as captured by the unemployment rate or the output gap; see for example Flynn and Honohan (1986) and the summary in Kenny and McGettigan (1997) . Bacon et al. (1982, p. 35) summarise the view of Irish inflation in this period:
…Up to 1979, the dominant influence on inflation was the relationship between Ireland and the UK. This arose given: (i) the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate with sterling; (ii) that the UK is the dominant trading partner; (iii) exports and imports constitute such a large proportion of activity in goods and services; and (iv) demand patterns for non-tradable goods and services tend to be somewhat similar for a variety of cultural and historical reasons.
To capture the state of the business cycles we rely in this paper on the difference between the rate of unemployment and the NAIRU, which we treat as an unobserved variable. Furthermore, we incorporate import prices in domestic currency to control for external price developments. Our main finding is that both of these variables played important roles in accounting for movements in Irish inflation both during the period of fixed exchange rate against Sterling and afterwards. Thus, there is a well-defined Phillips curve in Ireland.
One reason why we find a role for domestic demand is our use of data for an extended sample period. Interestingly, prior to Phillips' paper, several other researchers, such as Tinbergen (1936 and 1951) and Klein and Goldberger (1955) , studied the causality from unemployment (or some measure of demand slack) to (wage) inflation, with mixed results. However, as Humphrey (1985) notes, the major difference between these "early" estimates of the Phillips curve and Phillips' later work was the latter's implicit emphasis on a long time time-span of data for studying the relationships. 2 To our knowledge, no other authors have studied Irish inflation over such a long sample period.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the evolution of monetary arrangements, inflation and development of employment in Ireland since independence. Section 3 discusses the issue of the interaction of domestic demand and inflation in Ireland. Section 4 provides an overview of how the data are compiled and briefly reviews our final data series. In Section 5 we study the unit root properties of the data, discuss our benchmark specification and present estimates of the model. Section 6 concludes.
The Irish economy since independence
The sample period analysed in this paper includes a three monetary regimes, and a great deal of economic change. Here we discuss these developments in turn.
Monetary regimes and inflation
As noted above, monetary policy in Ireland has operated under several different regimes since the 1920s. Following independence in 1922, the monetary system was initially unchanged since the monetary arrangements appeared to function satisfactorily. 3 Nevertheless, the old arrangements were not deemed suitable for an independent country and in 1926 the Government established a Banking Commission to review the monetary and financial system and propose changes. The
Commission advised that the State should establish its own currency at par with Sterling and that a new Currency Commission should assume responsibility for the issuance of bank notes. These recommendations were included in the Currency Act of 1927 that introduced the Saorstát pound, which was fully backed by Sterling assets and redeemable in Sterling in London.
While these arrangements fell short of those in economies with a central bank, the Irish financial system functioned well and was closely integrated with the London money market. With the new currency fully backed and the Currency Commission's objectives limited to ensuring convertibility against Sterling, the credibility of the exchange rate parity was not in question.
Further impetus towards the creation of a central bank came following the Commission of Inquiry into Banking, Currency and Credit which reported in 1938, and which led to the established of the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) in March 1943. Kelly (2003) notes that the new central bank lacked some traditional banking functions, in particular the ability to restrict credit conditions, which implied that it was not in a position to set interest rates and to conduct an active monetary policy.
Indeed, the functioning of the Currency Commission and the CBI, coupled with the fixed exchange rate against Sterling, implied that monetary arrangements in Ireland are best described as those of a currency board, at least until the early 1970s. 4 As a consequence, Irish inflation rates and interest rates followed closely those in Britain and were thus determined with little, if any, reference to domestic economic conditions although, of course, these were heavily influenced by those prevailing in the United Kingdom.
The close link to Sterling was broken in 1979 when Ireland joined the European Monetary System as a founding member. While monetary policy remained focussed on the requirement of exchange rate stability, the central rate of the Irish pound against the Deutsche Mark was realigned seven times by a total of 35.75% between September 1979 and January 1987.
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The pound was devalued by a further 8% in January 1993, and the EMS bands were subsequently broadened to +/-15% in the summer of 1993.
Finally, in January 1999 Ireland became a founding member of European Monetary
Union. Irish interest rates and inflation rates were therefore again largely determined by developments outside of the domestic economy.
Thus, Ireland experienced three monetary regimes in the period that we study: the 1922-1978 Sterling period that involved a perfectly fixed exchange rate; the [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] EMS period that involved repeated devaluations against the German Mark; and the 1999-2012 EMU period that involved membership in a hard currency area with policy set with reference to economic conditions in the Euro area. Not surprisingly, these regimes are associated with quite different inflation behaviour. Table 1 shows that the annual inflation rate averaged between 4% and 6% in the two first periods, but less than 3% in EMU period. 6 Interestingly, while Irish inflation was almost equal to the rate of change of import prices in the Sterling period, it was higher than the rate of import price inflation in the EMS and EMU periods. One interpretation of 4 See Honohan (1995) . 5 See Artis and Taylor (1994, Table 1 ). 6 Furthermore, the standard deviation of inflation was much lower after 1999 than before. these findings is that while inflation was largely externally generated in the Sterling period, a large part of inflation was generated domestically from 1979 onward.
Economic developments
The period we study is characterized by significant structural change. Between 1841 and 1911, the share of employment in industry declined from 29% to 23% (O'Rourke (1995)), implying that Ireland was far from industrialized at the start of our sample period. Nevertheless, living standards increased markedly in the post-famine period, an apparent anomaly which is attributable to emigration. The flow of emigration continued through the first part of our sample period, however, the destinations for emigration abruptly narrowed following the 1929 Depression and the closing of the North American borders. This is emphasized by Neary and Ó Gráda (1991), who show that emigration to the US and Canada slowed from 18.8 per thousand of the population per annum in the period 1926-1931 to just 0.7 per thousand per annum over the period [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] , with emigration to elsewhere not meeting the shortfall.
The effect was a rise in the labour force, such that while the unemployment rate rose, so too did number employed. Policies undertaken by the Fianna Fail government which came to power in 1932 also acted to raise employment: a programme of house building created almost 20,000 construction jobs between 1932 and 1938. 7 In addition, the 'economic war' with Great Britain and the broader introduction of protectionist policies, had the effect of increasing domestic industry: while net agricultural output declined marginally during this period, industrial output increased some 46%. The employment effect in the agricultural sector was smaller however, since tariffs imposed on cattle exports by the UK as part of the economic war resulted in a shift in agricultural production away from land-intensive grazing towards labour-intensive tillage (Neary and Ó Gráda (1991) ). Lee (1989) notes that Ireland was 'unusually ill-equipped' for the economic impact of the Second World War. In particular, in contrast to other small, neutral, European 7 For a discussion of these measures see Lee (1989). economies, Ireland had no industrial base: while Switzerland, for instance, saw unemployment fall from 13.2% in 1936 to 1.6% in 1945 as a result of an armament drive, Ireland had no similar reduction in unemployment, and no consequent shift towards industrial employment. On the other hand, the period also saw a resumption of emigration, albeit at relatively low levels and now predominantly male and to Britain, which relieved unemployment pressures.
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In the post-war period, industrial production grew more rapidly. From 1946 From to 1952 jobs in industry increased by over 50,000, but even with this increase, the industrial workforce remained less than half the size of that in agriculture, and only 20% of the entire workforce (Lyons (1972) ). Aside from this, the fear raised in 1942 by Sean
Lemass that war-time emigrants might return to overburden the economy once hostilities ceased did not materialize, and with emigration continuing apace into the 1950s, the unemployment rate began to decline in the post-war period (Lee (1989) ).
The introduction of Whitaker's program for Economic Development in 1958 had the reduction of unemployment as one of its main aims (Ó Gráda (1997) ). While the opening of trade under the economic programs brought initial pain as redundancies increased, the size of the industrial workforce surpassed that in agriculture in the late 1960s. This was as much due to the decline in numbers working in the agricultural sector as it was the growth in the industrial sector: between 1961 and 1971, the agricultural workforce declined by 88,000, while the industrial workforce increased 61,000. Growth in the services sector ensured that overall employment rose over the period (Kennedy et al. (1988) ). The progression of the Celtic Tiger from a fundamentals-driven boom to a creditfuelled property bubble saw the unemployment rate reach all-time lows. However, the bursting of the property bubble, and the concurrent global financial crisis, saw unemployment soar again jobs across the economy, in particular the construction, and net emigration returned.
While the unemployment rate provides information on the state of the economy at a point in time, in a Phillips curve setting it is important to compare the unemployment rate to the NAIRU, the rate of unemployment at which there is no upward or downward pressure on the inflation rate. The NAIRU is a time-varying 9 Barry et al (1999) .
concept, and a number of factors affect it at each point in time. Emigration has often been referred to as the 'safety valve' which helped to keep unemployment lower than otherwise during much of the period (see, for instance, Walsh (1999) ). In so doing, it is likely that emigration also affected the NAIRU, and therefore the level of inflation, given the unemployment rate.
A number of studies have argued that there is an equilibrium unemployment gap between Ireland and the UK, whereby, emigration from Ireland ensured that the Irish unemployment rate never rose too far above that in the UK.
10 Indeed, estimates have been made of the equilibrium level of the unemployment gap at which there would be no net flow of migrants.
11 Honohan (1992) shows that the Irish unemployment rate has tended to adjust in the medium term to movements in that in the UK. Meyler (1999) addresses the question of the impact of this gap on inflation more directly, by using it as the 'slack' measure when estimating a Phillips Curve relationship for Ireland. The intuition is that when the gap increases, emigration follows, reducing supply in the Irish labour market and increasing wage and price inflation. Nevertheless, Meyler (1999) (Bentolila et al. (2007) ). Since the inflation rate was stable or declining through this period in Spain, this study gives an indication of the effect of immigration on the NAIRU. It seems reasonable to infer that emigration might have a symmetric but opposite effect.
Literature review: domestic demand and inflation in Ireland
Surprisingly few papers have sought to estimate a Phillips Curve for Ireland, arguably because of a long-held belief that domestic demand had no role to play in the Irish inflation process. This view was apparently formed following a series of papers by P.T. Geary and co-authors in the 1970s (Geary (1976) , Geary and Jones (1975) , Geary and McCarthy (1976) Even prior to these statistical findings however, the view that domestic demand was not a relevant factor was evident in Geary et al. (1970) . This paper notes that in the post-war period to 1966, the trends in consumer prices in Ireland and the UK were similar because money incomes exceeded productivity to the same degree in both economies. The paper notes, with some alarm, the divergence in inflation rates thereafter, and argues that this is the result of wages in Ireland outstripping those in the UK (Geary et al. (1970) In contrast, Leddin (2010) finds a role for unemployment in a New Keynesian framework while Bermingham et al. (2012) and Meyler (1999) find a significant role for unemployment gaps. However, the sample periods in these later studies differ from those examined by Geary and others, suggesting that there may have been a change in the structure of the economy, perhaps post-EMS. This is an issue we will examine in more detail in Section 5.
Nonetheless, the dominant idea from that earlier time period, summarized by Bacon et al. (1995, p. 35) , that
"up to 1979, the dominant influence on inflation was the relationship between Ireland and the UK"
seems difficult to justify when looking at long-run data from that time. In the first instance, although the correlation between annual inflation in the UK and Ireland is 0.92 over the period 1923 to 1979, this says little about the transmission mechanism at work. A naive and obviously too simplistic view is that all components of the CPI were tradable with prices set in British markets. A more developed hypothesis is that non-traded goods prices were determined by production costs that were very similar to those on British economy because of the close integration of the two economies, similar demand conditions and the fixed exchange rate. Under the latter view, the non-traded component of inflation and therefore overall inflation was determined by
Irish factors, but these were in turn so strongly influenced by developments in the British economy that it was difficult to detect their role, given the small samples typically studied. 
Data description

The data
In this section we review the data used in our econometric analysis. We use data on unemployment, inflation and import prices over a period of 80 years. Such long time series are not readily available from a single source; the data used here are compiled from a number of secondary sources.
We draw on Gerlach and Stuart (2014) who discuss in detail the compilation of long time series from a number of sources. Briefly, the current vintage of data is used as far back as possible since it is assumed that it is subject to smaller measurement errors than older vintages. Older time series are then spliced together using growth rates in order to construct a single time series. When more than one series was Prior to this, the import price is proxied using UK wholesale prices taken from Mitchell (2007) .
Review of individual time series
In this section we review the final data series used. We begin by plotting Irish CPI inflation and the unemployment rate in Figure 
Econometric estimates
Unit root tests
Before estimating the econometric models, we first test whether the rates of change of consumer and import prices and the unemployment rate have unit roots. We perform Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (ERS) unit root tests on the annual changes of consumer and import prices and the unemployment rate (Table 2 ).
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that when the lag length is selected using the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root at the 1 per cent confidence level in all cases, except for inflation for which we can reject it at the 5 per cent level. When the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used we fail to reject the null for the inflation rate. However, this may be because of a lack of power. Using the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (ERS) test, which has greater power, we reject the null at the 5 per cent level for inflation, and at the 1 per cent level for the unemployment rate and import price inflation. We therefore treat all variables as stationary.
Benchmark Specification
We use a standard Phillips curve model to explain Irish inflation. Whilst there has been much theoretical and empirical debate over the specification of the Phillips curve relationship since the 1960s, it remains a central part of the toolkit of many policy makers and central bankers.
14 The model holds that inflation, , depends on its lagged value, proxying inflation expectations; the difference between unemployment, , and the NAIRU, ; and the rate of change of import prices (measured in local currency), . Phillips curve models are best interpreted as a reduced form for inflation in which both demand factors, as captured by the wedge between the unemployment rate and the NAIRU, and supply factors/cost-push shocks, as captured by import prices.
Since the lag structure is not known a priori, we allow for two lags of past inflation, the current and two lagged values of the output gap and the rate of change of import prices to enter. The model can be written:
where, for reasons that are made clear below, denotes a dummy variable. In the interest of brevity, we refer to ̃ as unemployment below.
We have added a time subscript to the constant to allow for the possibility that it may change over time. Such changes are empirically very important and capture changes in steady-state inflation rate over time.
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While we will generally assume that , we will also consider the case in which the intercept follows a random walk with drift: .
This model is deliberately overparametrised and we do not expect all lags to be needed. However, since we have no priors about the lag patters, it is desirable to start from a loose specification and let the data speak.
14 For instance, a Phillips curve relationship has been used to explain why core inflation failed to decline and why unemployment rose so dramatically in the aftermath of the "Great Recession". Montoya and Döhring (2011) summarise the recent evidence. 15 For an excellent review of the literature on changes in the inflation process over time and some empirical evidence for the US, see Cecchetti et al. (2007) .
In order to estimate this model, we need to make some assumptions about the NAIRU. Two possibilities are obvious. We could assume that it is constant, in which case it is subsumed in the intercept that we will include when estimating equation
(1). Of course, it seems highly implausible that the NAIRU has been constant in the 80-year period that we consider. We therefore go on to estimate the unemploymentinflation relationship under the assumption that the unobserved NAIRU has followed a random walk, that is, .
To see how this can be done, for ease of exposition consider a simplified version of equation (1):
Differencing the equation and noting that , we have that:
Equation (2') implies that, under the assumption that the NAIRU or the intercept follow random walks, estimates of the impact of unemployment on inflation parameters can be obtain by regressing the Phillips curve model in equation (1) in first difference form, provided that the errors are allowed to follow a first-order moving average structure.
It is easy to see that, given the relative importance of the and shocks, as captured by the ratio of their variances, will determine the size of the MA coefficient.
Thus, if the or shocks are dominant, the MA parameter will be close to -1 hereas if the shocks are dominant the MA parameter will be close to 0. Since it seems likely that shocks to inflation are much larger than innovations to the NAIRU, we expect a moving average coefficient "close to" -1. If the intercept follows a deterministic time trend or a random walk with drift, will be non-zero and the model for the change in inflation must be estimated with a constant. Since the inflation rate is stationary in the full sample, is constant so that . Equation To keep the notation simply, the above analysis considered the simplified Phillips curve in equation (2). Redoing the same analysis using the more general Phillips curve in equation (1) we obtain:
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(2") ( ).
Estimates
Next we turn to the econometric work. Since preliminary regressions indicated that , , , and were insignificant in the full sample, we dropped these parameters. Following the suggestion in Stock and Watson (2011), we report ordinary and White standard errors in Table 3. Given that the price level data starts in 1924 and we have one lagged inflation rate, we use the sample period 1926-2012.
Since preliminary estimate of equation (1) Real GDP shrank in the order of 1.7% that year, and consumption declined in real terms by almost 7.5 per cent, while the decline in investment appears to have been 16 If the constant in the equation was fixed, Kalman filtering could be used to obtain direct estimates of the NAIRU. In this model in which the constant may change, we can't distinguish between changes in the intercept and in the NAIRU.
even larger.
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Ó Gráda (1997) time shortages began to take hold strongly. Lyons (1972) notes that in 1943 private motoring virtually ceased, long distance travel became increasingly difficult even using public transport, gas and electricity usage were cut, coal became almost unobtainable at times, and rationing began of bread, tea, butter, sugar and clothes. At 
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A dummy is therefore needed to capture this effect.
The results in the first column of Table 3 show that lagged inflation and the current and lagged rate of change of import prices are highly significant. The long-run passthrough of import prices is estimated to be and thus somewhat below unity. The twice lagged unemployment rate is also highly significant, suggesting a slow passthrough from the cyclical state of the economy to inflation. 
Subsample estimates
Given that Ireland transitioned from a fixed exchange rate to a managed float in 1979, it seems possible that the inflation process, and therefore the Phillips curve, changed. Next we therefore re-estimate the equation for the subsample 18 See the online databases for the IMF's World Economic Outlook in October 2008 compared to the database for October 2009. 19 A two-year lag from unemployment to inflation might seem long. However, one would normally expect about a 4 quarter lag from the output gap to inflation. Since unemployment is a lagging variable in the business cycle, a longer lag from unemployment to inflation seems plausible. 20 The test is conditional on the estimated values for the parameters on the dummy variables.
when the Irish pound was linked to Sterling. As before, we first explored whether a constant was significant if included but found that it was not (p = 6.1%). The results in column 2 of Table 3 show that the parameter estimates for this sub-period are very similar to those for the full period. In particular, twice-lagged unemployment is highly significant. The hypothesis that the residuals do not display serial correlation of the second order cannot be rejected (p = 32.8%) and the hypothesis of nonnormality of the residuals also does not reject (p = 95.9%).
Column 3 of the same However, and for the reasons discussed above, with inflation declining gradually in this sample it seems appropriate to introduce a constant in the regression. The results, in column 4, show that it is highly significant. Interestingly, so is the twicelagged unemployment rate.
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The estimated parameter is also much larger in absolute value than in the full sample and the estimated parameter on import prices is much smaller. This latter finding is compatible with the idea that because the exchange rate was flexible in the post-1979 period, import prices were more volatile and swings in them were less persistent than previously, leading firms to adjust prices less to import price changes. Tests for serial correlation and non-normality of the residuals again do not reject (p = 15.1% and p = 86.8%, respectively).
Conclusions
Early, influential research indicated that there was no Phillips Curve relationship in Ireland in the period towards the end of the Sterling exchange rate link. This was attributed to the small open nature of the Irish economy, and its particularly close links with the UK, which was taken to suggest that there was no role for domestic factors in price determination. This view has long been held in the literature, where little further attempt has been made to estimate this relationship, and the only studies that find a role for domestic factors in the determination of prices focus on the post-EMS period.
However, these early studies covered relatively short sample periods. In this paper
we study the determination of consumer price inflation in Ireland in the period 1926-2012, a longer sample period than any other previously used to test the relationship.
We estimate a backward-looking Phillips Curve incorporating unemployment relative to the NAIRU, to capture the state of the business cycle and import prices to capture external price developments. We model the NAIRU as a random walk and let steady-state inflation follow a random walk with drift in the 1980 to 2012 period.
We find a statistically significant effect of unemployment on inflation. While the exact estimate varies over time, the effect is present in both the 1926-1979 period, when the Irish pound was pegged to Sterling, and the 1980-2012 period when the Irish pound first participated in the ERM and then was subsumed in the euro area.
As a result, we conclude that the findings in early studies that no Phillips curve relationship existed simply reflected a particular, relatively short sample period. The impact those findings had on policy was surely important, and our results surely give weight to Nelson's (2008) argument that Irish policymakers should have focussed more on maintaining monetary and fiscal policy consistent with an output gap of zero, rather than non-monetary instruments to control inflation. The implications could be far-reaching if, as Nelson argues, this misperception was one of the main reasons for the failure to restore low inflation until the mid-1980s. Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis, White standard errors are reported in brackets. */**/*** denotes significance at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
